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COMMENT
The Asbestos Dragon: The Ramifications
of Creative Judicial Management of
Asbestos Cases
Valle Simms Dutcher
INTRODUCTION
A. Effects of Litigation: The Asbestos Dragon
Asbestos litigation has been a major factor in the "tort
explosion" crowding the dockets of state and federal courts.1
To date, more than 350,000 asbestos lawsuits have been filed
and approximately 100,000 are currently on state and federal
dockets.2 For every suit settled or adjudicated, two more are
filed.3
1. Andrew Blum, Asbestos Confusion Continues, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 32
(a total of 20,000 to 25,000 cases are currently pending in federal courts and 55,000 to
70,000 remain on the dockets of state courts). See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Jr.
& James A. Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 731, 733-35 (1992) (discussing the tort reform movement).
2. Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, Symposium in Honor of Edward
W. Cleary: Evidence and Procedure for the Future: The Effect of Equity on Mass
Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 295 n.145 (1991).
3. Blum, supra note 1; Paul Hoversten, Historic Asbestos Trial to Start, USA
TODAY, May 6, 1991, at 3A; Edward Frost, Asbestos Suits Consolidated, A.B.A. J.,
1
956 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
Cost estimates for asbestos litigation and compensation in
personal injury cases may be as high as $87 billion." Defend-
ant asbestos manufacturers and named co-defendants have
paid staggering sums as a result of the duplicative relitigation
of these cases.6 In 1990, the Johns-Manville Trust reported
spending $1 million per week on outside counsel litigation de-
fense costs alone.' At the time Eagle-Picher filed for bank-
ruptcy, it reported paying claims that amounted to $2.3 mil-
lion per week.7 In addition to Johns-Manville and Eagle-
Picher, several other manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy
protection in an effort to reduce transaction costs and place a
ceiling on liability.' One result of the bankruptcy filings by
manufacturers is that plaintiffs have brought suit against dis-
tributors and other alternative defendants.' It has been sug-
gested that this type of mass litigation has had a negative ef-
Oct. 1991, at 16.
4. Briggs L. Tobin, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform
Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage
Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 457 (1989) [hereinafter "Lim-
ited Generosity"].
5. Id. (in addition to litigation and compensation in personal injury cases, esti-
mates for property damage litigation and abatement costs are as much as $4 trillion
with equally staggering estimates for potential punitive damages); see also Edward F.
Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1987) (discuss-
ing potential waste of judicial resources and possible inconsistent judgments from
duplicative litigation).
6. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 129 B.R. 710,
750 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated and remanded by, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992) [hereinafter Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.]. See also Arthur R. Miller &
Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Crisis, 10 REV. LITIG. 419,
421 (1991) ("Since 1987, filings against Johns-Manville have averaged almost 20,000
per year.").
7. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 750.
8. E.g., In re Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991);
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45 B.R. 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Amatex, 37 B.R.
613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Johns-Manville Corp, 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). See generally Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 848 (1984); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1987); Raytech Corp. v. White, Civ. No. B-89-623,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19755 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 1991).
9. Hoag Levins, Asbestos Abatement Beyond '92: A Future Shaped by the
Courts, ECON, Dec. 1992, at 44 (courts are now adjudicating cases imputing to the
distributor knowledge of the substance's harmful effects).
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fect on the competitiveness of American business in general. 10
Plaintiffs have fared no better than defendants in asbes-
tos litigation. Judicial attempts to consolidate asbestos cases
have been frustrated by choice of law principles which dictate
that such issues as causation, damages and rights of contribu-
tion and indemnity be governed by appropriate state tort
law. 1 Because of the variety of state law responses to prod-
ucts liability, courts have been unable to impose a uniform
tort law on consolidated cases. 2 This has resulted in lengthy
trials and delay in compensation for injured plaintiffs.13 In
fact, many plaintiffs die of asbestos-related disease without
ever reaching trial or receiving the "justice" promised by our
legal system. 4
Additionally, the court must protect the interests of
plaintiffs who have yet to manifest full-blown symptoms of as-
bestos-related disease to insure that funds will remain availa-
ble to compensate successful plaintiffs in the future. 5 It has
been predicted that, by the year 2015, as many as 265,000
people will have died of diseases associated with asbestos ex-
10. See Burroughs v. Northern Telecom, Inc. (In re Repetitive Stress Injury
Cases), 142 F.R.D. 584, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that minimizing transaction costs
in litigation is important to the viability of American industry); Ashley v. Abbott
Labs., 789 F. Supp. 552, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (possible anti-competitive effects of lim-
its on courts' jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
11. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (federal courts
must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit).
12. Andrew T. Berry, Selected Current Issues in Product and Toxic Tort Liabil-
ity and Mass Torts, 491 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 577 (1990) (arguing that even when issues can
be tried through evidence common to the consolidated cases, individual issues such as
exposure, injury, and compensatory damages must be tried separately or by small
groups of plaintiffs and, therefore, the theoretical benefits of consolidation may be
lost).
13. Miller & Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 421 (Federal Judicial Center statistics
reveal that "the average disposition time of an asbestos case terminated in federal
court in 1989 was 995 days. ); Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6,
129 B.R. at 750.
14. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 759.
15. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52
B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Johns-Manville conducted several studies estimat-
ing liability that would result from future asbestos claims as the rationale for its reor-
ganization under Chapter 11).
1993]
3
958 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
posure.16 Since asbestos-related disease is both latent and pro-
gressive, this figure includes a large number of yet-to-be-iden-
tified future plaintiffs.17 Asbestos fibers are resistant to
degradation and, once inhaled, remain in the lungs where they
cause the gradual destruction of lung tissue."' Significant de-
crease in lung capacity, or asbestosis, may not manifest itself
for twenty years after initial exposure.19 Asbestosis is inexora-
bly followed by the eventual onset of malignant mesothe-
lioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung, heart and abdomen.2"
Unless courts adjudicating consolidated asbestos cases protect
the interests of those whose disease is now in the latent stage,
it is likely that the costs of current litigation and associated
damage awards will exhaust the corporate assets of defendant
corporations, leaving no funds available to compensate future
claimants.2
These statistics, and the tide of human suffering they re-
present, constitute the "asbestos dragon." Judges in state and
federal courts across the country are currently jousting with a
beast that refuses to be vanquished by available procedural
mechanisms.
B. The Judiciary: Disillusioned Knights on Overburdened
Chargers
Judges who are involved in adjudicating asbestos cases
have assumed an increasingly aggressive managerial role in at-
tempting to solve the asbestos crisis in the courts.22 Judge
16. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 746; see also
Note, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases? Manville's
Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVTL. L. 465, 466-67 (1984) (predicting that tens of
thousands will become ill or die from asbestos-related diseases in years to come).
17. GEORGE A. PETERS & BARBARA J. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES:
MEDICAL, LEGAL & ENGINEERING ASPECTS, 53-65 (1980).
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 120.
20. See BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS 37-103 (1984).
21. Roe, supra note 8 (discussing means of estimating future mass tort claims).
See also Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1131 n.53 (1983).
22. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982).
[Vol. 10
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Jack B. Weinstein, sitting in the Eastern District of New
York, has identified three factors that have forced judges on
both the state and federal level to engage in unprecedented
creativity in managing mass tort cases: (1) the lack to date of
an effective national administrative regulatory scheme capable
of controlling undesirable conduct by manufacturers; (2) the
absence of a comprehensive social welfare-medical scheme;
and (3) the lack of adequate state or federal legislation con-
trolling these cases.2 In 1990, the Ad Hoc Committee on As-
bestos Litigation, comprised of six federal judges appointed
by Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist,24 called for legis-
lation that would enable the courts to circumvent procedural
and choice of law rules that currently cripple judicial attempts
to resolve the crisis in a unified way. 28 However, legislation
aimed at reforming the civil justice system to provide for cen-
tralized treatment of multi-district mass tort litigation has
been repeatedly rejected by Congress.26
23. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 270.
24. Miller & Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 431.
25. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 44-45 (1990); Weinstein &
Hershenov, supra note 2, at 270; Stacy Adler, Judges Ask for Solution to Asbestos
Case Jam, Bus. INs., Mar. 18, 1991, at 3 (although the report of the U.S. Judicial
Panel cites crowded dockets as well as delays and relitigation of the same issues,
attorneys and judges involved with asbestos litigation do not believe that legislation
will be forthcoming).
26. Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Product Liability as a Federal Policy Issue,
in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 247 (Peter H. Schuck ed. 1990). But see An-
drew Blum, Congress Next for Asbestos Mess?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 7 (over-
tures have been made to the Clinton administration proposing a national asbestos
compensation bill that would streamline the compensation process); Weinstein &
Hershenov, supra note 2, at 270 n.3.
See, e.g., Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1985, H.R. 3090, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (seeking to establish workers' compensation type pro-
gram for asbestos and other toxin-related injuries); Asbestos Workers' Recov-
ery Act, H.R. 1626 and S. 1265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). A bill providing
federal district courts with original jurisdiction in mass tort cases where at
least 25 persons sustained injuries resulting in damages exceeding $ 50,000
per person, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3116-17 (1990) was passed by the
House of Representatives, id. at H3119, but not adopted by the Senate. Con-
gress did pass Senator Biden's Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), which attempts to address problems of
case management in complex and other litigation. The Judicial Conference of
5
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in the absence of federal legislation to resolve the crisis,
the judiciary has turned to creative use of procedural devices
to consolidate the cases, streamline trials and encourage set-
tlement. The greatest promise for resolving large numbers of
cases in a single forum are consolidation under the Multidis-
trict Litigation Act,27 class action under Federal Rule 23,28
and the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction in Chapter 11 re-
organization.2 9 However, despite creative judicial manage-
the United States has drafted a 14 point plan for handling the problem of
cost and delay in civil litigation. See Judicial Conference Approves Plan to
Improve Civil Case Management, 22 THIRD BRANCH 1, 1-3 (May 1990)
[hereinafter THIRD BRANCH]. In addition, the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee chartered by Congress and consisting of members appointed by the
Chief Justice recently issued a report in which it recommended that Congress
amend the multi-district litigation legislation to enable consolidation for
trial, as well as for pretrial proceedings and to make other changes that
would enable related state and federal cases to be consolidated in the federal
courts. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 44
(1990). In September 1990 Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed an ad hoc com-
mittee composed of six federal district and appellate judges to recommend
methods of addressing the asbestos mass tort backlog in the courts. See
THIRD BRANCH, supra, at 1. Legal academics and judges also have advo-
cated federal legislation. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION PROJECT, various drafts (1987-1990); Mullenix, Class Resolution of
the Mass Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REV.
1039 (1986); Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in Complex
Litigation Arising from Disasters, 5 TOURo L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Di-
sasters]; Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disas-
ters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Preliminary Reflections];
Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone, 98 F.R.D. 323
(1983). But see Sedler & Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Fed-
eral Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76
(1989) (opposing consolidation of mass tort litigation in single federal court
on federalism and choice of law grounds). For a general discussion of the
government's refusal to cooperate in mass tort litigation, see Feinberg, In the
Shadow of Fernald: Who Should Pay the Victims?, BROOKINGS REV., Sum-
mer 1990, at 41.
Id.
27. Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)); see generally John T. McDermott,
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973).
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B), 23(b)(3).
29. See Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2638 (1978) (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988)). See HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
20.01 at 578 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/13
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ment,' 0 and use of procedural devices, consolidated asbestos
cases continue to evade resolution.3 '
C. Winning Some Battles While Losing the War: Problems
with Consolidation Techniques
Section One of this article reviews the principles of feder-
alism inherent in the rules of choice of law and various state
responses to tort liability that continue to frustrate judicial
attempts to create a global resolution to the asbestos crisis in
the courts. Section Two discusses the principles and limita-
tions inherent in consolidating asbestos cases under the Mul-
tidistrict Litigation Act,'2 Federal Rule 23 "limited fund"
class action" and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.' " The
section also reviews exemplary cases which demonstrate the
current trend toward judicial activism and procedural innova-
tion. Section three concludes that the problems inherent in
adjudicating mass tort cases are not so much procedural as
constitutional. While changes in procedural rules would assist
the courts in consolidating large numbers of cases for trial,
such procedures would nevertheless infringe on constitutional
principles of federalism and individual rights within the judi-
cial system. Therefore, mass tort cases involving latent disease
and multiple defendants should be handled outside the adver-
sarial context of the judicial system. It would be more expedi-
tious and cost-effective to resolve such cases through a na-
tional claims resolution center administered by the legislative
branch of government.
30. See Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 792-840
(using both bankruptcy jurisdiction and class action joinder to preserve the solvency
of the Johns-Manville Trust); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 771 F. Supp.
415 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (transferring 26,639 cases to a single forum under the Multidis-
trict Litigation Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1407); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (utilizing innovative representative sampling method to
create groupings of plaintiffs for trial of common issues).
31. Blum, supra note 1. See also Asbestos Litigation Eludes Resolution, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 28, 1992 - Jan. 4, 1993, at 6.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1179 (1979).
1993]
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I. Federalism and the Mass Tort Case
A. Choice of Law: Of "Lex Loci Delecti," "The Better Rule"
and "The Chancellor's Foot"
Even if a court succeeds in consolidating a large number
of asbestos cases in one forum by using MDL transfer or a
class action under the Federal Rules, major constitutional ob-
stacles to adjudication remain. 35 In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague,3" the Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause37 and the Due Process Clause38 of the Constitu-
tion mandate that when a court acts as the forum for litiga-
tion having multistate aspects or implications, it must respect
the sovereignty of sister states and may not apply its own law
to a multistate case if doing so would infringe on the interests
of another state. 9 If the plaintiff lives in or was injured in a
state other than the forum'state, the domicilary state or the
state where the injury occurred has a legitimate interest in the
litigation. 0 Additionally, due process requires that the fo-
rum's choice of law decision must be fundamentally fair to
both litigants based on the existence of significant contacts
with the forum state.41
The asbestos cases involve geographically scattered plain-
tiffs and defendants. A state court, or a federal court exercis-
ing diversity jurisdiction, may use procedural rules to bring
large numbers of cases together before a single forum. How-
ever, choice of law rules present a stumbling block to courts
35. Additionally, bankruptcy cases involve special jurisdictional issues. See
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, altering both
the substantive and procedural bankruptcy law); The Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 Amendments), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 28 Stat. 335
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988)) (codifying the Marathon holding and specifically
preserving the jury trial right for personal injury or wrongful death claims against a
bankrupt estate).
36. 449 U.S. 302 (1980).
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
38. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
39. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
40. Id. at 312.
41. Id. at 313.
[Vol. 10
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seeking to apply a uniform tort rule to consolidated cases.4
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed that choice
of law considerations are grounded in the Constitution and
that the concept of federalism forms part of the system of
checks and balances in our government. " No state can create
a law which operates to create rights or interests in another
state and, conversely, a state must recognize the sovereignty
of the laws of its sister states."
Therefore, even when a court can exercise jurisdiction
over a citizen of another state, the court must turn to its
choice of law rules to determine whether it may constitution-
ally apply its own substantive law to the case before it.4 Each
state has created its own choice of law rules which guide not
only the state courts, but also federal courts sitting in diver-
sity actions within the state."
However, choice of law decisions have been called "a veri-
table jungle," and a "reign of chaos dominated in each case by
the judge's 'informed guess' as to what some other state than
the one in which he sits would hold its law to be."' 47 In a mass
tort context, this problem is magnified, making it "more diffi-
42. Maurice Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 946, 955 n:39 (1981); Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law in Multistate Class Actions after Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1
(1986).
43. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (the issue
of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in a class action is entirely distinct from the
question of the constitutional limitations on choice of law; the latter calculus is not
altered by the fact that it may be more difficult or more burdensome to comply with
the constitutional limitations because of the large number of transactions which the
State proposes to adjudicate and which have little connection with the forum); All-
state, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (state must have a significant aggregation of contacts with
the parties and the occurrence that forms the basis of the cause of action in order
that the application of a state's law be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair);
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause) and U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV
(due process).
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, amends. V, XIV; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§1(1), §42 cmt. a (1934).
45. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (federal court in diversity must apply substantive
law of the state in which the court is sitting). See generally Lynn Carson, Choice of
Law Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 199, 203 (1990).
46. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
47. In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
1993]
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cult or more burdensome to comply with constitutional limita-
tions because of the large number of transactions which the
state proposes to adjudicate and which have little connection
with the forum.
48
Eighteen states adhere to the traditional lex loci theory
of choice of law.49 This rule proposes to yield predictable re-
sults by requiring the application of the law of the place
where the injury occurred in tort suits.50 However, a victim
may not be able to determine the place where those injuries
occurred because of the latency of asbestos-related disease.5 1
Further, commentators have called the lex loci rule "mechan-
istic in operation and myopic as to consequences" because it
ignores the realities, in a modern industrialized society, of
multistate interests in a dispute.5"
Many states have discarded the "place of injury" ration-
ale in their choice of law rules and, instead closely examine
the policies underlying the laws of the conflicting forums. Two
states have adopted a "governmental interest" approach in
which the trial court is required to weigh the competing gov-
ernmental interests in the dispute and determine which
should have the controlling effect in the case. 53 Six other
48. Joint E & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R.' at 879 (quoting
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985)).
49. Carson, supra note 45, at 207.
50. E.g., Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 450 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Mass. 1983)
(Massachusetts mother had heart attack upon hearing that son had died in a plane
crash in Illinois. Court held that the place of injury was Massachusetts.). See also
Carson, supra note 45, at 205-06; Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6,
129 B.R. at 881.
51. See, e.g., Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 305 S.E.2d 528, 529 (N.C.
1983) (plaintiff was exposed to asbestos while working in several different states).
52. Maurice Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 946, 948 (1981).
53. E.g., Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal.
1978)(California's interest in the application of its outmoded law requiring compensa-
tion for injury to a key executive is outweighed by Louisiana's more progressive law
encouraging companies to insure executives by disallowing such claims); Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (application for
Colorado's guest statute was justified in an automobile accident, even though parties
were domiciled in New York, because the host-guest relationship was formed in Colo-
rado); B. Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Carson, supra
note 45, at 213-14.
[Vol. 10
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states combine the governmental interest approach with "the
most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Conflict of Laws, weighing the justified expecta-
tions of the parties and the purposes and objectives of the
competing states' laws.54 Two states have adopted the "center
of gravity" test which directs the court to examine where and
how the parties' interests intersect.5 5 The fact that a trans-
feree court must apply the law of the court of origin of the
case 56 creates a further complication for trial courts already
overburdened by the asbestos litigation crisis.
Differing choice of law analyses lead to inconsistencies in
results. In asbestos cases:
some courts have determined that the plaintiff's last place
of exposure to asbestos was the place where his injury oc-
curred. Others, relying to some extent on the discovery
rule statute of limitations, have concluded that the place
of injury was the state in which the plaintiff's injury man-
ifested itself and was diagnosed. Still other courts have
held that the place of injury was that in which the injury
came to light, was diagnosed, and was linked to exposure
to asbestos products.
5 7
Not surprisingly, there has been an outcry among the ju-
diciary and legal scholars for a Congressionally mandated uni-
54. Carson, supra note 45, at 215 (listing Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, and Washington); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CHOICE
OF LAWS § 6 (2d ed. 1971). When there is no directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and inter-
national systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic poli-
cies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id.
55. Carson, supra note 45, at 219-20 (listing New York and North Dakota).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 621
(1964) (where defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court is obligated to
apply the state law that would have been applied if there had been no change of
venue); Carson, supra note 45, at 261.
57. Carson, supra note 45, at 259.
1993]
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form choice of law rule for mass tort cases." Without federal
legislation, vast discretion rests on the interpretation of the
individual trial judge which may lead to an outcome determi-
native result. 9
B. State Tort Law: Balancing the Sword and the Shield
1. The Sword of Justice: Expanding Theories of
Recovery
From the 1960's through the mid-1980's, tort law exper-
ienced a pro-plaintiff trend, resulting in an expansion of theo-
ries of compensation."0 Many states replaced the absolute bar
to the recovery of a contributorily negligent plaintiff with
comparative fault, allowing a plaintiff who was partially at
fault for his own injuries to recover to the extent of the de-
fendant's negligence.61 The downfall of the privity require-
ment also serves to expand the number of defendants that a
plaintiff could sue. 2 Finally, the modern theory of strict lia-
bility for dangerous or defective products greatly extends a
plaintiff's ability to sue manufacturers and distributors.
Under the strict liability theory, if a plaintiff can prove that a
manufacturer produced the product, that the product caused
the injury and that the product was defective, then the manu-
facturer will be held liable for damages regardless of whether
or not the product was manufactured in a negligent manner.6 3
58. See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggretive Procedure in
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 519 (1991) (for a com-
prehensive listing of current legal scholarship).
59. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 n.158 (1988) (citing Ste-
phen B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 33 (1988)).
60. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 483; see generally Stephen D.
Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987) (collecting
cases).
61. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67
(4th ed. West 1971) (identifying pure comparative negligence, modified comparative
negligence and the "slight-gross" system of comparative negligence as variations in
state tort laws.) [hereinafter KEETON].
62. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 891.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; KEETON, supra note 61, at § 75,
534-38.
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In several states, the "market share" theory allows a
plaintiff who cannot identify which manufacturer produced
the product which caused the injury to recover for his injury.6 4
The plaintiff may sue one or all of the manufacturers of a ge-
neric product.6 5 If the product is found to be the cause of
plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff may recover from defendants
according the percentage of the sales market they held at the
time of injury.6 A large number of courts also now recognize
such injuries as increased risk of disease and diminution of
"quality of life" as compensable in tort.
These evolving theories of recovery have opened new
doorways to compensate plaintiffs injured in our complex in-
dustrial society. They have also opened a floodgate of litiga-
tion in our courts.6 " There was a 758% increase in the number
of products liability suits filed between 1975 and 1985.69 The
massive increase in filings was primarily attributable to the
onslaught of asbestos,7 0 Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin cases. 1
Large jury awards of punitive damages expressed the public's
outrage at the transgressions of industry. The judiciary has
regarded the tort system's primary function as a means to
64. KEETON, supra note 61, at 655.
65. Id.
66. Abbott Lab. v. Sindell, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985); Weinstein & Hershenov, supra
note 2, at 310; Berry, Current Issues, supra note 12, at 577 (noting that some courts
have "either as a matter of policy or product-specific analysis, have refused" to apply
the theory).
67. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-10 (6th Cir. 1988);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (upholding award of over $5
million where residents were deprived of running water because of chemical contami-
nation of groundwater in the community).
68. Theresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ.
L. REv. 303, 311 (1991-92); Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R.
at 891.
69. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 311 (citing Toxic POLICY WORKING GROUP, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE Toxic POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, Ex-
TENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY (1986)).
70. See Mark Galanter, The Day after the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV.
3, 24-25 (1986).
71. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 311.
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provide compensation to plaintiffs,"2 i.e. a method of allocat-
ing the costs of doing business in an industrial society to those
who benefitted from the operation.73
2. The Shield: Backlash and Tort Reform Favoring
Defendants
However, in the 1980's, the pro-plaintiff trend began to
reverse as state legislatures responded to outcries from indus-
try that damage awards laws were threatening the viability of
American business.7 4 The reformers argued that the expansion
of tort recovery had turned "manufacturers and distributors
into de facto insurers of their products.715 Additionally, man-
ufacturers claimed reluctance to market new products for fear
that they might trigger a new onslaught of lawsuits.7 6 In re-
sponse, tort reform legislation was enacted by 42 states be-
tween 1985 and 1987 as part of the backlash against tha large
verdicts won by plaintiffs in products liability cases. 77
In addition, there has been a growing reservation among
members of the judiciary about the products liability system
72. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 307. "The post-war role of the fed-
eral courts . . . has been to protect the injured who come before them against those
who have caused . . . unjustified harm. This judicial role is particularly important in
the absence of any alternative remedies emanating from the executive or legislative
branches." Id. at 323.
73. KEETON, supra note 61, at § 101; see generally Weinstein & Hershonov,
supra note 2, at 308-10.
74. Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980's Tort Crisis
and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 209-10 (State laws restricting
claims and remedies in products liability suits have swept the country. Between 1985
and 1988, every state except Pennsylvania and Vermont had enacted tort reform leg-
islation.); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 481 (quoting the Chairman of
the Board of the National Association of manufacturers as saying that the expansion
of products liability "[has] brought a blood bath for U.S. business."). See generally
KEETON, supra note 61, at 1-9 (discussing tort reform statutes and listing statutory
and case law reflecting the "backlash" against the expansion of plaintiff recovery).
75. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 322.
76. See Peter W. Huber, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988). See, e.g., Barry Meier, A Product Dead-Ended by Liability Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at 50 (Monsanto refuses to produce a new product that
could be used as an alternative to asbestos for fear of incurring costly litigation
expenses).
77. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 891.
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which has manifested itself in a "quiet revolution 7 8 from the
bench preventing further expansion of pro-plaintiff
doctrines.7 9
The result has been a "patchwork" of rules affecting both
procedures and limits on damage awards and attorney fees.80
Each state has grown its own individualistic response to the
conflicting needs of its citizen-plaintiffs for compensation and
to the economic well-being of its industry. In effect, each
state's tort system represents an interlocking web of rules that
serve both the interest of plaintiffs in recovering for injury
and the interest of business in economic survival.8 1
Most states now have legislation which allows contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors 2 Similarly, methods governing
allocation of the burden of liability among codefendants vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Under the pro tanto method,
the judgment against a nonsettling defendant is reduced by
the amount of any settlement with a codefendant. The non-
settling defendant pays the balance even if it exceeds any fu-
ture judgment of its share of liability. In contrast, the pro-
portionate fault method of setoff seeks to "limit liability to
the relative culpability" of each codefendant.84 Under this
method, a plaintiff may receive either more or less than full
recovery depending on what he receives from the settling de-
fendant and what he is awarded at trial as damages from the
nonsettling defendant.8 5 For instance, plaintiff could settle out
of court with one defendant and then receive a large damage
78. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 481.
79. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 304.
80. Id.
81. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 273-74.
82. Irwin H. Warren & Darla C. Stuckey, Recent Developments in Class Actions:
Attorneys' Fees, Partial Settlements and Awards to Named Plaintiffs, in CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 1992 625, 655 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 430 1992) (discussing split in the circuits regarding the-
ories of contribution in securities litigation).
83. See, e.g., In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991);
Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890
(1990).
84. Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231.
85. Warren & Stuckey, supra note 82, at 647.
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award against another defendant. Plaintiffs total compensa-
tion would therefore be larger than the damages that would
have been awarded if all the parties had been before the
court."6 A final means of allocating the burden of liability
among defendants is the pro rata method. Here, the judgment
amount is divided by the total number of defendants found
liable, both settling and nonsettling, without regard to fault."
The legal patchwork interferes with the adjudication of
consolidated cases from many states.88 As discussed in the
preceding choice of law section, a court adjudicating a mass
tort case must abide by choice of law rules. These rules may
often require the court to apply the tort laws of several differ-
ent states to individual issues in the case to comport with
principles of federalism even though procedural rules have
permitted the geographical consolidation of the cases. The im-
position of a uniform national tort law to govern mass tort
cases presents one possible solution. However, the judiciary
has expressed hesitancy to "cut the Gordian Knot presented
by state tort law diversity using the sword of federal common
law without congressional warrant."8 9
II. Judicial Activism and the Rules of Procedure
Despite the enumerated difficulties in adjudicating the
mass tort case, the costs associated with case-by-case litiga-
86. See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231.
87. See In re Jiffy Lube Secs. Litig., 927 F.2d at 161 n.3; see also Newberg, supra
note 29, § 12.42A at 114.
88. See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encom-
passing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76,
98-100 (1989).
89. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 878; see also
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (Court of
Appeals sitting en banc held that asbestos case was not appropriate for the creation
of a federal common law because of the absence of a uniquely federal interest and the
practical problems that would attend the displacement of state law); Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68 (1966); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Substantive federal rule should apply after considering the following factors: (1) the
existence of a substantial federal interest in the outcome of the litigation; (2) the
effect on this federal interest should state law be applied; and (3) the effect on state
interests should state law be displaced by federal common law.").
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tion in the classic adversarial mode of our court system are
unacceptable. Driven by the need to manage the growing
number of asbestos cases crowding court dockets, many judges
have turned to procedural rules to bring large numbers of
cases together in the belief that judicial efficiency will also
serve the needs of the parties.90 The rationale for consolida-
tion is that a unified proceeding not only reduces transaction
costs for all the parties, but results in more consistency in
awards to plaintiffs. 1
However, as will be discussed below, the procedural de-
vices available do not grant the courts broad enough jurisdic-
tional powers to compel parties to join a consolidated action
and, even when consolidation is achieved, parties may still
protest that due process has been violated if their interests
are not sufficiently represented before the court. Attempts to
resolve the asbestos crisis through consolidation continue to
be restricted by the limitations of the rules of procedure9" and
the constraints of the Erie doctrine.93 In addition to constitu-
tional problems and procedural inadequacies which continue
to loom over efforts to speed large numbers of cases through
the system, the role of the judiciary is also changing. Of neces-
sity, judges are assuming the role of administrator/manager
rather than passive adjudicator as they become more actively
involved in pre-trial negotiation, settlement and
distribution. 4
90. Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG.
495, 495 (1991).
91. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Is-
sues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 237 (1991).
92. Kyle Brackin, Salvaging the Wreckage: Multidistrict Litigation and Avia-
tion, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 655, 659-60 (1992) (noting that the Federal Rules, promul-
gated in 1938, offer the courts only a limited ability to dispose of related cases
simultaneously).
93. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1934) (mandating that a
federal court apply the law of the state in which it is located to cases arising out of
diversity jurisdiction). "Law" was interpreted by the Court to include the common
law as well as the statutory law of the states. Id. The Court later expanded this doc-
trine in Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), to include the
application of state choice of law rules by federal courts sitting in diversity.
94. Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Real-
ity, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 667 (1979).
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A. Consolidation under the Multidistrict Litigation Act 95
1. The Statutory Scheme
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consists of
seven circuit and district court judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.9 " Empow-
ered by the Multidistrict Litigation Act,97 the Panel conducts
hearings to consider motions for consolidation and transfer of
groups of related cases. 8 On the hearing record, the Panel de-
cides whether to consolidate geographically scattered cases for
pre-trial proceedings.9 9 This broad grant of jurisdiction is one
of the primary advantages of consolidation under § 1407.100
To be eligible for transfer, cases must be civil actions
pending in different judicial districts of the federal court sys-
tem. ' As a prerequisite to consolidation, the Panel is re-
quired to consider whether consolidation would serve judicial
efficiency and the convenience of the parties and to determine
whether the cases share common questions of fact.102 The pri-
mary factor influencing the Panel's decision to consolidate the
cases is efficient judicial administration of the consolidated
cases. 0 3 The Panel routinely assumes that grouping cases
serves the parties and the judicial system by allowing pre-trial
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1988).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1988) (requiring findings of fact by the Panel).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) ("When civil action involving one or more com-
mon questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."); See gen-
erally John T. McDermott, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D.
215 (1973).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) §
31.12 (2d ed. Clark-Boardman 1986).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988); Blake M. Rhodes, The Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 721 (1991) (noting
that the Panel has wide latitude to transfer cases that it feels may be beneficially
handled through consolidated pretrial proceedings).
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900 ("It is expected that such transfer is to be ordered only
where significant economy and efficiency in judicial administration may be
obtained.").
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matters to be decided expeditiously and uniformly.10 4 Once
the cases are consolidated under a single judge, discovery can
be coordinated on a national basis, enabling the parties to ne-
gotiate .a trial plan.105 The second factor, convenience of the
parties, is largely ignored by the Panel despite Congressional
mandate in the statute. 06 In practice, the Panel accords little
weight to this consideration and may transfer cases over the
protests of the parties. 07 This is so because the Panel consid-
ers the litigation collectively, and inconvenience imposed on
some parties is not deemed to outweigh the advantages of
consolidation to the group as a whole.'0 8 Finally, the Panel
broadly interprets the factual similarity requirement; the
cases are consolidated if judicial efficiency will be served.'0 9
Because the cases are viewed as a group, the Panel's decision
on consolidation often equates judicial economy with the "col-
lective good."
2. Application of the Statute
In addition to the broad grant of jurisdiction to transfer
and consolidate cases for pre-trial discovery, the Multidistrict
Litigation Act may also encourage the speedy conclusion of
the cases. Consolidation may increase the likelihood that the
parties will settle as a result of this global pre-trial discov-
ery. 10 Additionally, the transferee judge may decide disposi-
tive pretrial motions such as summary judgment, motions to
dismiss and striking affirmative defenses."'
104. See Rhodes, supra note 102, at 719-20.
105. Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the Procedural Management of Mass
Exposure Litigation, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 541, 556 (1989).
106. S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
107. See In re Aircrash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp 1505,
1513 (D. Colo. 1989) (transfer may take place over the objections of the parties).
108. See Rhodes, supra note 102, at 720 n.63 (citing In re Library Editions of
Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (J.P.M.D.L. 1968)) (Panel must consider
"multiple litigation as a whole and in light of the purposes of the law.").
109. Rhodes, supra note 102, at 719.
110. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 292.
111. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Trans-
feror Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 582-83 (1978); see also Rhodes,
supra note 102, at 724; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
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While these techniques may aid the speedy resolution of
consolidated cases at the pre-trial stage, both judges and com-
mentators agree that, in its current form, § 1407 procedure is
still limited and fraught with problems."1 2 First, although
MDL allows consolidation across district lines, it is limited to
the federal system and no formal method exists to include the
huge number of cases concurrently pending in state courts;
therefore, it does nothing to alleviate the huge backlog of as-
bestos cases in state courts.1 3 Second, when pre-trial proceed-
ings are complete, the Act requires the Panel to remand the
cases back to their courts of origin.11 4 Therefore, even though
preliminary discovery issues may have been resolved in the
consolidated proceeding, the cases return to the crowded
dockets of the courts where they were originally filed for addi-
tional discovery and trial. 1 5 Finally, § 1407 does not resolve
the issue of compensation for future plaintiffs. To be eligible
for inclusion in consolidated proceedings under § 1407, the
case must have already been filed in a district court. Obvi-
ously, many future plaintiffs have not manifested the symp-
toms of asbestos-related disease and have yet to bring suit.
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting
summary judgment against all plaintiffs who opted out of the class certified following
consolidation).
112. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 293-96.
113. Id. at 296. Note, however, that Judge Weinstein, as Chief Judge of the East-
ern District of New York, arranged to provide cooperation between Judge Sifton in
the Eastern District and Judge Freedman of the State Supreme Court of New York
to consolidate pre-trial proceedings and discovery. The two courts also appointed the
same person as special master under the Federal Rules and referee under the New
York code. Both judges presided over joint pretrial and trial sessions. Attempts at
settlement proved unsuccessful and, finally, the cases were severed for trial. However,
a number of defendants settled and pretrial preparation was greatly expedited by the
joint effort. Whatever the success of this innovative technique, it serves to demon-
strate the inconvenience caused by MDL's limitation to federal cases and emphasizes
the need for the ability to consolidate state cases as well.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (Panel Rule No. 14(a)):
Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee court
shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless or-
dered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or another district
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 1406 . . . no further action of the Panel shall be
necessary to authorize further proceedings including trial.
Id.
115. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 5.22 at 222-23 (Clark Boardman 1978).
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These claimants are not precluded by the doctrine of res judi-
cata from bringing their own claims in the future.1 1 6 There-
fore, an MDL court which cannot make provision for damage
awards to parties not before the court, cannot provide final
resolution and defendants will still be burdened with the costs
of relitigation.
MDL judges have sometimes retained the non-settling
cases for trial despite the limitations of the rule of remand in
§ 1407.' However, even when the cases are retained for trial,
the latent effect of asbestos exposure creates problems with
proving causation of injury.' 8 Plaintiffs suffering from asbes-
tosis or mesothelioma must identify the manufacturer of the
particular asbestos product which caused the injury as well as
the circumstances surrounding the exposure."19 Because of the
time lag between the exposure and the onset of disease, this is
often impossible for the asbestos victim.'2 ° As a result, an
MDL trial court is forced to hold a series of "mini-trials" on
causation, applying the appropriate tort law to each cause of
action, or to remand the cases to the appropriate district
courts.'' Therefore, even where the MDL judge can conduct a
mass trial on some issues, individual claims still must be re-
manded or heard in "mini-trials that could drag out the pro-
cess for years""'2 and also result in inconsistent decisions
116. Brackin, supra note 92, at 685-86.
117. See Hondorf, supra note 105, at 554.
118. Id. at 555 (arguing that MDL judge may bring pending state cases under
the court's jurisdiction through removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441); but see Weinstein &
Hershenov, supra note 2, at 282 n.61 (arguing that there is "no formal way to consoli-
date cases pending in two or more state courts" since removal must be on motion of
the defendant, and such action would be defendant's choice and not at the discretion
of the MDL judge).
119. Jeffery S. Brenner, Alternatives to Litigation, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 779, 788
(1989) (describing similar problem in the class action context).
120. Id.
121. Hondorf, supra note 105, at 557 (advocating retaining the cases by certify-
ing the plaintiffs as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Brenner, supra
note 119, at 781 (courts are not equipped to manage the distinct factual situations
presented by toxic tort victims on this mass scale without legislative help).
. 122. Hoversten, supra note 3, at 3A (quoting a steel worker who filed suit in 1986
as saying, "We're all going to be dead by the time anything's settled."); Hondorf,
supra note 105, at 557 (noting that the goal of uniformity in MDL action is defeated
when cases are remanded after transfer and that the danger of inconsistent verdicts is
1993]
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where the cases are remanded to courts following diverse tort
laws. 12
3
Additionally, since a product may have caused injury to
thousands of individuals, it is almost certain that the funds
available from the defendant will be exhausted before all
those injured have been compensated.12' Because tort law re-
quires that injury be proved to a reasonable medical certainty,
those who have not yet become ill or those who have asbesto-
sis but have not yet exhibited symptoms of cancer have no
way to represent their interests before the court.125 Therefore,
MDL has no mechanism for providing for the "unknown"
plaintiffs or for insuring their future recovery against the
ever-diminishing assets of the defendant corporations.
Finally, because MDL does not provide for judicial con-
trol of attorney fees, plaintiff's counsel still receive massive
contingency fees and defendant corporations continue to
crumble under the costs of litigation. 128
3. In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation 127
When the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
broke its fourteen year precedent of refusing to consolidate
asbestos cases under § 1407,128 the decision was hailed as a
major step toward a final resolution of the asbestos crisis in
the courts. 2 ' The Panel transferred 26,000 asbestos cases
from 87 federal districts to Judge Weiner in Philadelphia for
pre-trial proceedings in July 1991. However, lawyers familiar
inherent in multiple simultaneous trials).
123. Id.
124. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 294 (noting that MDL still poses
due process problems because future plaintiffs cannot be bound or precluded by the
judgement when cases are consolidated by transfer and, therefore, finality cannot be
achieved by the technique).
125. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
126. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 294.
127. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L.
1991) (transferring 26,639 cases to a single forum under the Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
128. Id. at 417.
129. Id. at 418.
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with asbestos litigation saw potential problems with the ad-
ministration of the cases. First, the consolidated cases repre-
sented only one-third of the asbestos cases before the courts
since 60,000 to 70,000 state actions involving asbestos were
not covered by the MDL consolidation.130 Second, plaintiff's
counsel worried that the consolidation order would only cause
additional delays and that complainants would simply with-
draw from the consolidation and refile in state court.131
By Spring of 1992, progress reports from the Philadelphia
court indicated that only eleven cases had been remanded and
settled.132 Lawyers representing plaintiffs complained that the
defendants were purposefully using the MDL process to cre-
ate delay.133 The Plaintiff's Steering Committee, displeased
with the delays and Judge Weiner's handling of the case,
moved to dissolve the proceedings and requested remand back
to the districts from which they had been transferred.'
In an effort to further streamline proceedings, Judge Wei-
ner has also requested that the Panel conduct a hearing on
the issue of whether all asbestos bankruptcy proceedings
should be consolidated. 13 5 The Panel has agreed to schedule
hearings on both motions. 136 These early indications show that
consolidation of asbestos cases under MDL will not end the
delays associated with mass tort adjudication. Additionally,
the parties have expressed dissatisfaction with the strong
managerial stance taken by Judge Weiner.13 7
130. See State Courts: The Unknown Asbestos Factor, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1991,
at 6.
131. Id.
132. Blum, supra note 1, at 32.
133. Id. (quoting a plaintiff's attorney as saying that "the defense likes the MDL
because they are making money on money they're not paying us. They will string out
the process as long as they can.").
134. Andrew Blum, Asbestos Group Asks for Halt to MDL Process, NAT'L L.J.,
July 13, 1992, at 7 [hereinafter Halt to MDL Process].
135. Id.
136. See Andrew Blum, An Asbestos Judge Pushes to Combine Bankruptcy
Cases, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 15, 18.
137. Halt to MDL, supra note 134, at 7.
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B. Class Action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
1. The Structure of the Rule
Increasingly, scholars and legal commentators have urged
an expanded use of class action under Federal Rule -of Civil
Procedure 23 to resolve mass tort cases.13 Under Rule 23, the
common claims and defenses of parties in a class action are
unified in one representational lawsuit.13 9 Therefore, judicial
management of a class action is more efficient than consolida-
tion under MDL where the consolidated cases retain their sta-
tus as individual actions. Class action also facilitates judicial
management because the class will be represented by a small
group of attorneys, making settlement negotiations, control of
fees and communication between the judge and the parties
more efficient. 40 Finally, Rule 23 provides a technique for fi-
nal adjudication of the common claims of the entire group of
similarly situated plaintiffs. 1 As previously discussed, MDL
consolidation is limited to pre-trial procedure."12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) sets forth the general prerequisites
for class certification. These initial requirements protect the
due process right of class members" 3 by requiring a showing
that (1) the number of plaintiffs is so numerous that joinder is
impracticable by other procedural means, (2) that there are
common issues of law or fact that would make a class action
the most efficient way to resolve the dispute, (3) that the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class as a whole and (4) that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. 44
138. E.g., Sherman, supra note 5, at 550-52; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for
Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 593-96
(1987).
139. See Silver, supra note 90, at 497-98 (distinguishing class actions from
consolidations).
140. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 288.
141. Silver, supra note 90, at 497-98.
142. See discussion, supra, Part II.A.
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966);
see also Sherman, supra note 91, at 266-67.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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If these threshold factors are satisfied, the action must
still fall into the parameters of one of the categories described
in Rule 23(b). In the context of mass tort litigation, certifica-
tions of class actions have been upheld under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3)."" Rule 23(b)(1)(B), also known as
the "limited fund" class action, applies when adjudications
"would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests."" In contrast, a Rule 23(b)(3) class is appropriate where
"questions of law or fact common to members of the class
predominate [and a] class action is superior to other available
methods [of] adjudication."" 7 Before certifying a 23(b)(3)
class, the court must examine the interest of the class mem-
bers in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions, the nature and extent of litigation already
commenced, whether it is desirable to concentrate the litiga-
tion in a particular forum, and additionally, the likelihood
that the class will present management difficulties. " 8
2. Appellate Resistance to Class Action
Despite repeated attempts to bring asbestos victims into
one forum under Rule 23, appellate courts have typically re-
fused to certify such a class.14 9 Stumbling blocks to certifica-
tion of asbestos cases are inherent in the rule itself.
145. Marjorie H. Mintzer & Yasmin Daley-Duncan, Why Class Actions Are Not
the Answer, 22 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 25, 25 (1992).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note,
supra note 143, at 101.
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2 (West Publishing 1985).
149. See, e.g., Williams, Mass Tort Actions: Going, Going Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323,
329 (1983); Tobin, "Limited Generosity", supra note 4, at 459 n.11, 474-77; Yandle v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (not proper for class certifica-
tion because common questions did not predominate over individual questions of fact
and law). Additionally, the named plaintiffs could not adequately represent the un-
named plaintiffs because of varying questions of causation of the injuries suffered. Id.
at 572. See also In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (vacating certifi-
cation of a class of 2990 asbestos plaintiffs).
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The threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) serve to protect
the due process rights of class members. Certification is not
appropriate if the class does not meet the Rule 23(a) require-
ments of typicality, commonality and adequacy of representa-
tion. 150 These requirements are hard to satisfy in asbestos liti-
gation. Asbestos plaintiffs present distinct factual differences
in causation as well as damages and defenses. 151 Additionally,
because of the progressive nature of asbestos-related disease,
different plaintiffs will present different stages and types of
injury when suit is brought.152 However, trial courts tend to
equate the "benefit to be derived from" mass adjudication
with the commonality requirement of the Rule.153 Judicial em-
phasis at the trial court level is on procedural mechanisms
based on the assumption that what is efficient for the court
serves "the common good" of the parties.
Nevertheless, Advisory Committee comments to Rule 23
plainly state that class action is not appropriate for "mass ac-
cident" cases because, in practice, the unified case may degen-
erate into multiple lawsuits on causation and damages.""
Therefore, appellate courts have denied certification in cases
where members' claims are governed by the laws of various
states and would require individualized adjudication under
state tort law.1 55 In the context of asbestos litigation, due pro-
cess concerns are implicated. It has been held that named
plaintiffs could not adequately represent the interests of the
class as a whole where choice of law rules directed the court to
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
151. See Brenner, supra note 119, at 781.
152. Id. at 784-87.
153. See In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1984).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, supra note 143, at 103; Joint
E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 750. But cf. Weinstein &
Hershenov, supra note 2, at 288 n.98. Judge Weinstein refers to his earlier agreement
with the committee's opinioni as "an indiscretion" which he "has been forced to ig-
nore when faced with the practicalities of mass tort litigation." Id. Complexity of
asbestos cases makes them expensive to litigate: costs are exacerbated when each in-
dividual has to prove his or her claim de novo. See id.
155. See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983) (affirming denial of certification where 50 states' various laws on
punitive damages would be involved).
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apply the law of each plaintiff's state to questions of causa-
tion, liability and damages. 1
6
Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class may be certified if a common
"question of law or fact predominates over any questions af-
fecting only individual class members" and it is determined
that class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating
the claims presented.15 7 Therefore, if case management is
complicated by choice of law problems and a multiplicity of
issues, the use of 23(b)(3) is inappropriate. 1"8 Additionally, the
Rule imposes a significant burden by requiring class counsel
to provide notice to every member of the class.'
59
The major shortcoming of a Rule 23(b)(3) class is that it
does not create a mandatory class.' 60 Members can opt-out,
thereby defeating the purpose of bringing a "global solution"
to the dispute. 6 ' The opt-out provision can prove fatal to
maintaining a class action. For example, in the Dalkon Shield
litigation, plaintiffs' counsel indicated that, if class certifica-
tion were upheld on appeal, they would recommend that their
clients opt-out of the class.'12 The day before settlement was
reached in the Agent Orange litigation, more than 2,000 class
members chose to opt-out and therefore were not bound by
the hard-won settlement agreement. 6 To date, only two
156. Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (certifica-
tion denied because named plaintiffs did not adequately represent unnamed plaintiffs
because of varying questions of causation); see also Mintzer & Daley-Duncan, supra
note 145, at 26; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
158. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d at
853 (holding that the complexity of the litigation was inappropriate for class action
and that individual trials resulting in verdicts might be "equally efficacious" in pro-
moting settlement).
159. FED R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) ("[The] court shall direct to the members of the class
the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort."). See also Weinstein &
Hershenov, supra note 2, at 288.
160. FED R. Ctv. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (judgment of 23(b)(3) class action only binds
those members who have not requested exclusion from the class).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (requiring notice and opportunity for a class
member's exclusion; the "opt-out" option).
162. See Mintzer & Daley-Duncan, supra note 145, at 27.
163. Id. at 29.
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courts have created 23(b)(3) asbestos class actions that sur-
vived appeal. Both of these actions were limited by the "opt-
out" provision for 23(b)(3) actions.16 4
In contrast, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) creates a mandatory class
with no opt-out provision."' A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) action may
be certified if there is proof that individual suits will alter the
rights of others not present before the court.166 If a defendant,
such as an asbestos manufacturer, is sued by numerous plain-
tiffs in separate forums for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, there is a danger that the defendant's resources will be
exhausted before all potential plaintiffs are compensated.167
Proponents of the "limited fund" class action reason that cor-
porations faced with mass tort claims possess finite assets and
that the first plaintiffs to recover will compromise the recov-
ery of later claimants.168
However, appellate courts have insisted that movants
prove the existence of liability that exceeds the funds availa-
ble from the defendant.6 9 This requires the court to look be-
yond the confines of the cases before it and consider cases
pending in other courts, both state and federal, and, finally, to
164. In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (certifying a
23(b)(3) nationwide class seeking compensation for costs of asbestos abatement in
school buildings); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985)
(certifying plaintiff recovery for personal injury suffered because of exposure to asbes-
tos and for certain limited issues - state of the art defense, product identification,
product defect, negligence and punitive damages); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (class
member who so requests may opt out). See also Kevin Hudson, Catch 23(b)(1)(B):
The Dilemma of Using the Mandatory Class Action to Resolve the Problem of the
Mass Tort Case, 40 EMORY L.J. 665, 666 n.4 (1991) (discussing the hesitancy of appel-
late courts to uphold attempts at certification because of the "proliferation of issues"
in the mass tort case).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B); Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6,
129 B.R. at 826 (discussing the "limited fund" class action).
167. See Mintzer & Duncan-Daley, supra note 145, at 47.
168. Tobin, "Limited Generosity", supra note 4, at 464, 471, 474-77.
169. In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (vacating
certification of 23(b)(1)(B) class); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269,
277 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (finding failure "to establish the substantial probability of the
existence of a limited fund from which to compensate deserving class members"); see
also Tobin, "Limited Generosity", supra note 4, at 466-69, 477-79 (advocating class
creation based not on the size of the assets of the defendant, but on the number of
claims by plaintiffs and the need to create uniform and limited recovery).
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estimate the defendant's present and future liability in all fo-
rums. 170 In the past, this has been held to be both too specula-
tive, '7' and also violative of due process where all the claim-
ants were not before the court.17
2
Representing the interests of future plaintiffs is a particu-
lar problem in the asbestos cases. Because asbestosis is a pro-
gressive disease, the court faces an impediment to identifying
a defendant's total liability as there is no way to ascertain
with certainty just how many people were injured or even who
they are.' 73 Additionally, even though these plaintiffs and
their injuries are unknown, the Rule requires that their inter-
ests be represented in the action.' 74
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts 7 5 has been interpreted by some courts as
an impediment to personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in a
mandatory class action. 76 In Shutts, the Supreme Court held
that a court trying a class action case could exercise personal
jurisdiction over plaintiffs even where they did not have the
"minimum contacts" historically mandated by the rule of In-
ternational Shoe. 77 However, the holding was limited to
those classes where members received notice and had the
choice of opting-out. 7  The Court construed the presence of
the opt-out right to mean that plaintiffs who chose to remain
170. Tobin, "Limited Generosity", supra note 4, at 478-79.
171. E.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. Cal., 523 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 422 (inappropriate to pro-
ceed with 23 (b)(1)(B) class certification because there was no firm evidence that
awards of punitive damages in individual cases would impede the ability of future
claimants to obtain compensation and that not all claimants to the "fund" were
before the court because the "non-school" plaintiffs were not before the court).
173. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 746.
174. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987) (setting up a regis-
try and compensation system for future claimants).
175. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
176. Hudson, supra note 164, at 709-13.
177. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808-14 (citing, inter alia, International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
178. Id. at 812.
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in the action by not exercising their right had implicitly given
their consent to the trial court's jurisdiction." 9
Some courts have interpreted the Shutts rationale to
mean that the there can be no jurisdiction over the class
member unless each class member has given consent to juris-
diction or has sufficient contacts with the forum to satisfy the
due process standards of International Shoe. Since a "limited
fund" class has no opt-out provision to provide the vehicle for
implied consent, as was required by Shutts, it has been held
that courts may not exercise jurisdiction over a 23(b)(1)(B)
class action in the absence of minimum contacts between each
member of the putative class and the forum. 80 Therefore, the
final judgment in a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class action
could not bind plaintiffs with insufficient contacts with the fo-
rum. 18  This would, of course, severely limit the size of the
class and defeat any attempt for large scale resolution of the
litigation.
3. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc.182
Once the initial hurdles to class certification have been
surmounted, there is a great potential for class action judges
to manipulate procedure in the interest of judicial economy
even though, in actual practice, mass trials may add to com-
plications, delays and increased costs to litigants. " Judge
Parker, in the Eastern District of Texas, has been experi-
179. Id. at 813-14.
180. See, e.g., Waldron v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 124 F.R.D. 235, 237 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (the lack of opt-out provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) interpreted to
mean that consent is not possible and therefore the court cannot impose personal
jurisdiction on plaintiffs lacking in contacts with the forum).
181. Hudson, supra note 164, at 710; Miller & Crump, supra note 42, at 52-57.
However, other courts and commentators have used the "limited fund" theory to jus-
tify jurisdiction over class members. Under this theory, if there is proof that claims
exceed the defendant corporation's assets, the state where the assets are located can
exert in rem jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims' to those assets. Id. at 52; Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 798-800.
182. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
183. See Robert H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 78 (1989) [hereinafter Mass Trials]; see also Sherman, supra note
91, at 261-66.
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menting with creative procedural methods of dealing with as-
bestos cases since 1980.1" His aggressive management of large
scale asbestos cases, typical of the new judicial activism, has
sparked considerable controversy among legal
commentators.'88
In late 1986, more than one thousand asbestos cases were
pending on the dockets of the Eastern District of Texas and
150 to 250 new cases were being filed each month. 86 Judge
Parker initiated a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class of more than 2,000
plaintiffs in an attempt to dispose of all the claims in the dis-
trict in one mass trial. 87 Parker's plan called for the adjudica-
tion to take place in three phases. Phase One would try the
issues of product defect, common defenses and punitive dam-
ages. 88 The Phase Two trial would determine market share
liability of the defendants by determining the time and place
that each plaintiff had been exposed to the defendants' prod-
ucts.8 9 The Phase Three trial proposed to adjudicate actual
damages in order to reach an aggregate award for the class as
a whole. 190 The defendants strongly objected to the class certi-
fication and to the strict limits Parker imposed on discov-
ery. '9 Parker overruled their objections and denied their re-
184. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (cer-
tification of 23(b)(3) class for the resolution of common defense issues and liability
for punitive damages, but, defendants settled after only 16 days of trial); Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1361-63 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd in
part 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (consolidation of 30 cases with a small number of
cases set for "test" trials implemented to give defendant a "preview" of liability and
damages, resulting in a settlement of $12.4 million following jury verdicts of $2 mil-
lion per plaintiff in the test cases); see also Mullenix, supra note 58, at 488 (giving a
history of innovative techniques utilized by Judge Parker).
185. See, e.g., Robert H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779, 816-48 (1985) [hereinafter Joinder]; Mark A. Peterson
& Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of the Courts, 54
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 229, 231 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex
Litigation, 10 REv. LmG. 213 (1991).
186. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 490.
187. Sherman, supra note 91, at 262.
188. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990);
Miller & Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 428.
189. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.
190. Id.
191. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 494.
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quest for interlocutory appeal, hoping to "impel certain 'hold-
out' defendants to settle. '19 2
The defendants petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus and the appellate court not only granted the writ
but vacated the class certification for the Phase II trial
plan. 93 Even though certification was confined to a single dis-
trict and only one state's tort law, ironically, it was choice of
law problems that led the Fifth Circuit to vacate the Phase II
plan. 194 The appellate court held that the Phase II plan:
"while offering an innovative answer to an admitted crisis
in the judicial system, is unfortunately beyond the scope
of federal judicial authority. It infringes upon the dictates
of Erie that we remain faithful to the law of Texas, and
upon the separation of powers between the judicial and
legislative branches.1 95
In spite of the appellate ruling, Judge Parker kept the
cases together by consolidating them under Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(a). 98 He attempted to meet the individual causation re-
quirement by grouping plaintiffs by worksite to adjudicate
their exposure in Phase II and he grouped plaintiffs by dis-
ease category for the Phase III damages portion of the trial.19 7
When the parties appealed the plan for review, the appellate
court denied the appeal without opinion. 98
192. Id.
193. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990); Mullenix,
supra note 58, at 494-95.
194. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 520. The author also noted that Special Master
Jack Ratcliff had hoped that certification would succeed as only one law would apply
to the class because the class was confined to the district. Id. at 519.
195. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d at 711 (Texas tort law required individual-
ized proof of causation and that the "test case" method of adjudication allowed a
general causation, contrary to Texas law. As to the Phase III plan, the court held that
there were too many disparities among the various plaintiffs for their common con-
cerns to predominate.).
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (allowing joint trial "[w]hen .actions involving a com-
mon questions of law or fact are pending before the court.
197. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 503 (citing Memorandum and Order at 5-7,
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 58 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26,
1989)).
198. Id. at 504 (citing In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
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When the trial finally began, Judge Parker again used the
reverse bifurcation technique to encourage settlement by the
parties. 99 First, he tried the common affirmative defenses, pu-
nitive damages and gross negligence issues in Phase I.200 Then
he tried damages before reaching inquiry into the issue of ex-
posure to asbestos. 0 ' Parker again used the representative
sampling method in the Phase III portion of the trial. Two
juries heard 160 "sample" cases before two judges.202 The en-
tire trial lasted for more than four months.0 3 Prior to the
trial, the parties answered 1,885 sets of interrogatories and
took 2,345 depositions. 0 4 One thousand four hundred plain-
tiffs underwent medical examinations.2 0 5 At trial, 271 expert
witnesses and 292 fact witnesses testified.20 6 Fifty-eight law-
yers presented more than 6,000 exhibits constituting more
than half a million pages of documents.0 7
Since a Rule 42 consolidation lacks the procedural protec-
tions of a class action, 08 the fairness to litigants in the Phase
III trial is questionable. Additionally, the sheer mass of evi-
dence and testimony creates complications and costs that
would not have existed if the claims had been tried
individually.2 0 9
Through Judge Parker's aggressive and creative manage-
ment techniques, the consolidated cases were completely adju-
dicated by the end of 1990.210 However, the fact that choice of
law considerations had such a serious impact on a class certifi-
cation within a single district demonstrates the serious
problems facing mass trials of asbestos cases.2 1' As the Fifth
199. Id. at 564.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 565.
203. Mintzer & Duncan-Daley, supra note 145, at 29.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Silver, supra note 90, at 497-98.
209. Transgrud, Mass Trials, supra note 183, at 78.
210. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 495.
211. See Sedler & Twerski, supra note 88, at 98-99 (arguing that conflicts of law
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Circuit made clear, procedural innovations should not allow
the judiciary to infringe on the legislature's role as lawmaker
by creating the "best" law for the case at hand.212
C. Defensive Collectivization Under Chapter 11213
1. Reorganization under Chapter 11
Chapter 11214 of the Bankruptcy Code2 18 enables a finan-
cially distressed company to petition the bankruptcy court for
protective relief.21 6 Instead of going out of business and liqui-
dating its assets, a company in Chapter 11 remains a "debtor
in possession"2 17 while it develops a plan that will enable it to
remain a going concern while also addressing its debt. 18 The
plan is then submitted to the court and creditors of the com-
pany for approval.219 If the plan is approved, pre-petition debt
and equity interests are discharged220 and the company
emerges with a fresh chance at financial success.221
The Bankruptcy Code provides protection for both the
debtor company and its creditors in the Chapter 11 process.
During reorganization, the debtor company is shielded by the
automatic stay provisions of Chapter 11 which give the com-
pany respite from such actions as lien enforcement, foreclo-
sures, tax collections and entry of judgments in either state or
federal courts.2 2 Additionally, because the reorganization
principles prohibit mass adjudication of tort cases).
212. Mullenix, supra note 58, at 560.
213. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1988).
214. Id.
215. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988); see generally Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984).
217. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
218. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Bank-
ruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51, 79 (1992).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
220. C. Albert Parente, Chapter 11 Reorganization: A Valid Alternative to Go-
ing Out of Business, 65 N.Y.S. BAR J., Feb. 1993, at 53.
221. Id. at 45 (noting that Johns-Manville emerged from bankruptcy proceeding
"a revitalized, healthier company free of the asbestos logistic nightmare").
222. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988); A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,
1002-04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986); see generally Parente, supra
note 220, at 44-45.
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plan is binding on all the company's creditors, 223 the company
has the opportunity to resolve all pending claims against its
assets within the single bankruptcy proceeding. The company
gets a final resolution of its financial problems and emerges
revitalized, with a clean slate.
Chapter 11 provisions also protect the interests of claim-
ants to the bankrupt's assets by providing for the creation of
creditor's committees to represent the interests of both se-
cured and unsecured creditors.s 4 When the reorganization
plan proposes to settle with creditors for less than the total
value claimed against the bankrupt estate, the court cannot
approve the plan unless the impaired creditors vote to accept
its terms. 225 Additionally, the Code gives a bottom-line protec-
tion to claimants who do not accept the plan by providing
that the debtor's plan cannot give dissenting claimants less
than the amount they would have received if the company
had been totally liquidated. 2 '6 Finally, the Code protects the
Due Process rights of creditors who have tort claims against
the debtor by preserving the right to jury trial for these
claimants.2 2
2. Use of Chapter 11 in the Context of Mass Tort
Because bankruptcy procedure promises a financially
troubled company substantial relief of indebtedness, it en-
courages the company to face all of its creditors at once.228
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988).
224. 11 U.S.C. §§ 705(a), 1102 (1988); id. § 1123(a)(1) (dividing the creditors into
classes); id. § 1122(a) (requiring that claims represented within each class be "sub-
stantially similar"); id. § 1322(b)(1) (requiring no unfair discrimination against any
class). See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 52
B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (subdividing tort claimants committee into sub-
classes such as property damage and personal injury damage claimants); see generally
Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.04 at 596.
225. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
226. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i), (ii) (1988) (unless a creditor has accepted the
plan, the creditors in that class must receive not less than if the debtor were
liquidated).
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0) (1988) (personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy cases is
pending).
228. Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL.
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When a company faces massive tort liability in multiple fo-
rums, filing for bankruptcy has the additional advantage of
centralizing the litigation 229 since the bankruptcy court has
the power to fix the venue of pending tort cases against the
debtor in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending.2 30 Once the tort claimant has a judgment against the
debtor, the legal claim against the debtor's assets is converted
into an equitable claim for a pro rata share of the res in bank-
ruptcy. 31 Finally, a global settlement of pending claims is
made possible in bankruptcy because the court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction includes "all civil proceedings arising under ti-
tle 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11"1.232
The Code specifically allows for the certification of a class
of creditors under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.233 The bankruptcy court
may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
unknown future plaintiffs.23' Outside the bankruptcy context,
a class action is subject to the opt-out requirements mandated
by Shutts. 35 However, the essential difficulties with class cer-
tification discussed in the preceding section are not present
when the class is certified pursuant to a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Since the bankruptcy proceeding is characterized as an in
rem action,2 36 a class certified to deal with common creditor
issues in bankruptcy is not subject to an opt-out right.237
Despite the fact that Chapter 11 proceedings avoid many
of the pitfalls of other forms of procedural consolidation of
mass tort cases, problems remain. When an asbestos manufac-
L. REv. 43, 64 (1989).
229. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settle-
ment of Mass Torts: The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1990, at 79, 87.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988).
231. Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.14 at 620.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988); see generally Steven J. Parent, Judicial Creativ-
ity in Dealing with Mass Torts in Bankruptcy, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 381, 387
(1990).
233. BANKR. R. 7023.
234. See Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.09 at 596.
235. 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.09 at 597.
236. See, e.g., Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 735 (2d Cir.
1992), vacating and remanding, 129 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
237. See Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.23 at 620.
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turer files for Chapter 11, the basis of the filing is that, with-
out the court's protection, future tort claims will drive the
corporation into insolvency. 38 Therefore, future plaintiffs
must be included in, and bound by, the reorganization plan.
Because of the latent effects of asbestos exposure, the number
and value of potential claims are unknown." 9 If the bank-
ruptcy court is unable to determine what the aggregate liabil-
ity of the corporation is, it will be unable to provide for future
plaintiffs in the bankruptcy plan.24 0 The result is circular. The
Chapter 11 filing and its success in salvaging the debtor cor-
poration are both based on quantifying the unknowable value
of future claims. Further, circuit courts are split on the issue
of whether class proofs of claim are permissible under the
Code." Therefore, the propriety of class certification becomes
intertwined with the allowability of class proofs of claim.2 42
Like other forms of consolidated proceedings, bankruptcy
also faces jurisdictional limitations that interfere with efficient
resolution of mass tort cases. The bankruptcy court has juris-
diction to adjudicate "core" proceedings arising in the context
of the bankruptcy case.13 A cause of action is a "core" pro-
ceeding if it is "created by title 11 or . . .is concerned with
what are called matters concerning the administration of the
238. Feinberg, supra note 229, at 88; see also Kaighn Smith, Jr., Beyond the
Equity Power of Bankruptcy Courts: Toxic Tort Liabilities in Chapter 11 Cases, 38
ME. L. REV. 391 (1986).
239. See Feinberg, supra note 229, at 89.
240. See discussion of the failure of the Trust established for plaintiff compensa-
tion by Johns-Manville in Chapter 11 proceedings, infra Section II(C)(3).
241. Compare Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. (In re Standard Metals
Corp.), 817 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 839 F.2d 1383 (10th
Cir. 1987) (holding that class proof of claim is not permitted in bankruptcy as a mat-
ter of law) with In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1988) (by al-
lowing for certification of class, the Code implicitly allows class proofs of claim); see
generally Michael J. Guyerson & Darrell M. Daley, Propriety of Class Proofs of
Claim in Bankruptcy, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 250 (1989).
242. Guyerson & Daley, supra note 241, at 253.
243. See 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2) (1988); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 333 (distin-
guishing between "core" proceedings, in which the bankruptcy court is empowered to
enter a final judgment and "related" proceedings which must be submitted to the
district court for review).
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estate." ' In contrast, the bankruptcy court may not adjudi-
cate proceedings that are merely "related" to the bankruptcy
case. 45 The Code not only reserves the right to jury trial for
tort claimants against the bankrupt estate,46 but also ex-
cludes personal injury tort and wrongful death actions from
its definition of "core proceedings. '24 7
Bankruptcy proceedings are not a panacea for the
problems of expensive duplicative litigation and delays in
compensation to successful plaintiffs. Since the bankruptcy
court does not have the power to hear personal injury and
wrongful death cases, it must transfer them to the district
court. Even if the bankruptcy court establishes an alternate
dispute mechanism for settling tort cases out of court, the
Code seems to require that a dissatisfied plaintiff still have
recourse to a jury trial, where, of course, state law would ap-
ply. The successful plaintiff would then recover his judgment
in the bankruptcy proceeding. 248 Bankruptcy is not, therefore,
a more efficient method of dealing with mass tort cases as
compared with any of the other previously discussed methods
of consolidation.249
Finally, when there are multiple defendants in a mass
tort case, the bankruptcy of one defendant seriously impacts
the overall litigation.2 50 The bankruptcy of a key defendant
increases pressures on the remaining codefendants and widens
the scope of litigation as plaintiffs seek compensation from al-
ternative, solvent defendants.251 In asbestos litigation, the
244. H.R. Rep No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6400-01.
245. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988).
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0) (1988) (personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy cases are
pending).
247. Id.
248. See generally Newberg, supra note 29, § 20.23 at 628-29 (describing need
for courts and counsel to consider inevitable delay and loss of independent control by
counsel when determining most efficient method of resolving mass tort claims).
249. Id.
250. Deborah R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Per-
sonal Injury Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1967,
1978 (1992).
251. Id. at 1984; Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster
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bankruptcy of some defendants has removed them from the
mainstream. The remaining manufacturers bring their claims
for contribution to the meager pickings at the bankruptcy "ta-
ble" joined by newer defendants that have been brought in by
plaintiffs looking for the "justice" promised by our judicial
system. Instead of providing a solution for the asbestos crisis,
bankruptcy merely serves to exacerbate it.
3. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation (Findley v. Blinken) 5'
In August of 1982, Johns-Manville, the nation's largest
manufacturer of asbestos products, filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.153 The company based its filing on the projected
future claims of asbestos victims and a potential liability of
approximately two billion dollars. 54 Public reaction to the
bankruptcy announcement ranged from shock to outrage be-
cause of the "nebulous" nature of Manville's claim of insol-
vency.2 55 From 1982 to 1986, claimants, codefendants and
Devour Next, FORBES, Feb. 18, 1991, at 75.
252. 129 B.R. 710, 750 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated and remanded by,
982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (highlights of the complex procedural history of this case
may be found at footnote 253).
253. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Johns-Manville
bankruptcy filing upheld on appeal against claims of fraud and abuse of the bank-
ruptcy system by tort litigants); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (motion for appointment of legal
representative for asbestos-exposed future claimants); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming original bankruptcy plan establishing settle-
ment trust fund against challenge by personal injury claimants); Joint E. & S. Asbes-
tos Litig., 120 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Trustees of Manville personal
injury trust reported to the court that the assets of the personal injury trust were
insufficient to meet projected claims. In order to protect the trust from further deple-
tion, the court held that a mandatory class action would be certified to include all
claimants to the trust and that all state and federal cases pending against the trust
would be stayed.); Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, supra note 6,
(certifying the class action and modifying terms of original bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion); Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating the
judgment on the grounds that district court did not comply with FED. R. Civ. P. 23 or
the Bankruptcy Code in modifying the original bankruptcy plan).
254. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
255. See Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial
283 (1985) (litigants accused the company of filing to avoid "the constitutionally pro-
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Manville's representatives attempted to negotiate a reorgani-
zation plan. ' After two years of appeals, the plan was finally
consummated in 1988. The plan included an injunction insu-
lating Manville Corp. from further suits, and provisions for a
Trust Fund that would assume exclusive liability for pending
and future claims by asbestos victims. 57 The court retained
jurisdiction over the Plan and the Trust was made responsible
for administering a Claims Resolution Facility (CRF) to com-
pensate plaintiffs.2 58 Claimants to the Trust could either arbi-
trate their claims with the CRF or pursue individual tort ac-
tions for compensatory damages in the state courts.259
The Trust was doomed before it even went into opera-
tion. During the six year period while the Plan was being ne-
gotiated and appealed, 50,000 new claims were brought
against the company. 60 The bankruptcy, instead of providing
an orderly method of compensating victims, produced a "liti-
gation panic."2 6' Plaintiffs' attorneys found that they could
accelerate the Trust's payment of their clients' claims by ob-
taining a trial date. 2  Codefendants, hungry after six years of
bearing the entire brunt of asbestos liability, impleaded the
Trust in an effort to secure financial assets and recoup some
of their losses. 6 3
tected rights of present and future victims. Id. at 286); The Manville Bank-
ruptcy supra note 73 at 1 n.10 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Manville
ranked 181st in the Fortune 500 at time of filing for bankruptcy)).
256. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 751.
257. Id. at 751-52. The Trust is funded by insurance proceeds ($869 million),
bonds (face values of $1.8 billion and $50 million) and 80% of the stock in the reorga-
nized Manville Corp. Id. at 752-53. Additionally, beginning in 1992, Manville was to
begin making payments to the Trust of up to 20% of its annual profits. Id.
258. Id. at 753.
259. Id. at 753-54.
260. Id. at 754..
261. Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 755 (Final
Order of Judges Weinstein and Lifland regarding modification of Johns-Manville
bankruptcy plan); see also Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253, 120
B.R. at 663 (Memorandum on Stays) (describing procedural history of Johns-
Manville bankruptcy). "As against the maximum of $2.351 billion in assets, the Trust
compute[d] its liabilities for asbestos claims at over $7 billion" and estimated 47,000
future claims valued at $1.840 billion. Id.
262. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 755.
263. Id. (noting that this "necessitated retaining local counsel in nearly every
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The Trust, therefore, became subject to a "seeming para-
dox."2 " It was responsible for litigating suits against alleged
victims in an attempt to preserve adequate funds for future
claimants while fulfilling its fiduciary duty under the reorgan-
ization plan to "fairly and equitably" compensate claim-
ants.26 5 "In this Alice in Wonderland world, the Trust was
running faster and faster yet moving backward, while code-
fendants were being carried along, toward bankruptcy. '26 Not
surprisingly, only a year and nine months after "opening for
business," the Trust was "effectively out of funds" and the
Eastern and Southern District courts entered a stay order
pending revision of the reorganization plan for the operation
of the Trust.2
67
In September 1990, the Trust moved to be considered as
a limited fund under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 268 The court
concluded that the Trust was, indeed, "deeply insolvent. '26 9
The court appointed representative counsel to evolve a modi-
fied Settlement Plan.27 0 The class was conditionally certified
by District Judge Weinstein and Bankruptcy Judge Lifland in
November of 1990.271
state, participating in pretrial discovery and preparing tens of thousands of cases for
trial rather than merely evaluating them for settlement").
264. Id. at 760.
265. Id. See also Joint S. & E. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253, 120 B.R. at
665 (noting that "average payments to claimants by the Trust have more than
doubled those prior to the Chapter 11 filing" and contrasting the present role of the
Trust in providing "fair and equitable treatment of beneficiaries" with Manville's for-
mer role as "the hard-bargaining defendant in tort cases").
266. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 762. The court
noted the codefendants' concern because the "rates of judgments and court pressured
settlements accelerated their own cash outflow problems, driving more and more of
them toward bankruptcy as the insurance coverage was exhausted. . . . The asbestos
bonanza led to an increased search for more clients through unions and independent
solicitation and increased filings." Id. at 761.
267. Id. at 762.
268. Id. at 764. See also Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253, 120
B.R. at 653-54 (describing Special Master's Report, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos.
B 11656 (BRL) through 82 B 11676 (BRL), at 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1990)).
269. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 765.
270. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253, 120 B.R. at 668-70 (Ap-
pendix C, Stipulation of Settlement).
271. Id.
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Fairness Hearings to negotiate the proposed modifica-
tions of the Settlement, held pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e),
involved bitter disputes between plaintiffs, the Trust and co-
defendants. 72 Despite the fact that codefendants were
strongly opposed to many aspects of the modified Plan, Judge
Weinstein certified the class and took strong action to protect
the Trust's ability to fulfill what he described as its primary
role, compensation of victims of asbestos-related disease.273
The coupling of the 23(b)(1)(B) class with the broad powers of
the bankruptcy court served to provide the widest jurisdic-
tional power available.2 74 The "limited fund" rationale under-
lying the class certification gave the court jurisdiction over all
parties with an interest in the Manville Trust analogous to an
in rem action.275 Since the 23(b)(1)(B) class is mandatory, the
parties could not refuse to participate in the class action.276
Additionally, avoiding the limitations of MDL, Judge Wein-
stein was able to include pending state as well as federal cases
in the class by invoking the broad powers of the Bankruptcy
Code and the All Writs Act.277
To further protect the Trust from being diminished by
the costs of "satellite" litigation, the modified Settlement
"provide[d] mechanisms which remove[d] the Trust from the
tort system. ' 278 Potential claims on the trust were divided
272. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 766-71 (outlin-
ing positions of the parties on the Settlement).
273. Id. at 897. See Judge Weinstein's rationale for the settlement. Id. at 860.
274. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253, 120 B.R. at 654-59.
275. Id. at 656.
276. Id. at 654-55.
277. Id. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988), prohibiting a federal
court from staying existing proceedings in state courts except "as expressly author-
ized by Congress, or when necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectu-
ate its judgements." Id. However, Judge Weinstein found that the court's action in
consolidating state and federal cases falls under the "aid to jurisdiction" and judg-
ment protection exceptions to the Act. Id. Additionally, Judge Weinstein cited the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988), which gives the court power to "issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions of this title." Id. As a final authorization for the exercise of nationwide juris-
diction, Judge Weinstein cited the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988), empower-
ing a federal court to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aide of their
respective jurisdictions." Id. at 657.
278. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 902.
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into disease categories which were assigned value ranges. 9
Both plaintiffs and defendants who claimed indemnity or con-
tribution rights against Manville were limited to making their
claims through the CRF procedures outlined in the Plan.2 8
Absolutely no litigation could be filed against the Trust on
any issue, including "status or lack of status as a joint
tortfeasor or relative share of fault. .. ." 21 Further, the
modified settlement provided that "the trust will make no ap-
pearance in court."28 2 Rather, a defendant who paid a judg-
ment could only recover from Manville by submitting a proof
of claim to the Trust.2 83 The claims resolution facility would
then determine whether Manville was liable in contribution or
in indemnity.284 If liability was found, the CRF was charged
with assigning a value to the claim according to the disease
category of the claim.2" 5
Judge Weinstein, even as he certified the class and the
modifications, expressed reservations concerning the power of
the court to "approve a Settlement that modifies litigation re-
lationships between claimants and codefendants and
others."28 The evidence bar effectively removed codefend-
ants' ability to raise the classic products liability defense that
it was Manville's product, not the defendant's, which caused
the plaintiff's harm. Since Manville was the major producer of
asbestos products, other asbestos defendants have used evi-
dence of Manville's knowledge of the dangers of asbestos and
its large market-share to rebut plaintiff's claim for liability
279. Id. at 858-86. See id. at 912-26 (Appendix A to Trust Distribution Process;
description of Level I and Level II Categories).
280. Id. at 902.
281. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 253,
120 B.R. at 676.
282. Id. The order includes an evidence ban that "all beneficiaries will be en-
joined from asserting or introducing evidence to establish (a) that the Trust is a joint
tortfeasor, (b) that the Trust is in any way responsible for any injury, or (c) that the
Trust would have been responsible for any injury had it been made or remained a
party to the case." Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 878.
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and causation of their injuries. 8 '
Judge Weinstein also noted that Manville's absence from
court might "skew the results" in jury trials against other
manufacturers and distributors."" Codefendants argued that
juries might shift "a larger than expected share" of the liabil-
ity to them when Manville was no longer present in the
courtroom.289
The'impleader bar served to prevent distributors and
others from impleading the Trust or from bringing actions for
contribution or indemnity.290 Codefendants, distributors and
others who are sued by asbestos plaintiffs claimed that the
bar, coupled with the set-off provisions mandated by the Set-
tlement will cause them to bear a disproportionate share of
the liability for these claims.291
The pro tanto rule was chosen because it did not compro-
mise plaintiffs' ability to get full recovery from codefendants
and therefore encouraged early settlement with the Trust.29 2
Under both of the other theories of contribution, "pro-rata"
and equitable share, a plaintiff could potentially receive less
than the full value of the judgment when one of the defend-
ants is insolvent because the total judgment is allocated
among the total number of defendants. 293 The pro-tanto rule
instead requires that only the amount actually received by the
287. Id. at 902-03. Similarly, "[tihe plaintiffs will not be able to tar the co-de-
fendants with the abundant proof of Manville's pre-1982 wrongdoing." Id. at 902.
Additionally, the court notes that the availability of statistical information through
the Asbestos Information Act of 1988 "reduces the need to establish who were the
other parties manufacturing asbestos-containing material as long as the party-defend-
ant can show what a small percentage of total sales it contributed." Id. at 903.
288. Id. at 839.
289. Id. at 904. The court noted that just such a phenomenon took place in the
Brooklyn Navy Yard cases but also postulated that the opposite effect could hold
true. Id. Noting that Manville is part of "the vivid history of asbestos litigation in
this country" and expressing "mindful[ness] of federalism and comity concerns," the
court nevertheless instructed trial courts to "exempt the Trust [itself) from any ap-
pearances." Id.
290. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 905.
291. Id.; Id. at 871 ("There is little doubt that Section H (contribution rights), at
a minimum, presents substantial risk of altering constitutional and state law rights of
certain parties if read literally and expansively.").
292. Id. at 905; see generally KEETON, supra note 6, § 67 at 470-79.
293. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 893-94.
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plaintiff from another defendant be subtracted from the total
judgment against the non-settling defendant.294 Therefore,
plaintiffs would be free to collect from the Trust first and
then pursue litigation against other potentially liable parties.
At the Fairness Hearings, the codefendants argued that
the Settlement's prohibitions would "effectively repeal state
tort reform statutes of joint and several liability" by prevent-
ing them from impleading the Trust or presenting evidence
that would prove its liability. ' 5 Additionally, codefendants ar-
gued the modified Plan suggested a downward adjustment in
the share of responsibility to be borne by Manville relative to
the codefendants, which, under the pro tanto rule, would shift
an even greater economic burden from Manville to the other
defendants.9 6
Judge Weinstein examined several alternative rationales
for the application of a uniform choice of law to contribution
rights of the codefendants. First, he examined the possibility
of applying federal common law to the case.2 97 Even though
the parties' interest in the limited fund created conflict, this
interest was not "uniquely federal," and therefore, "in the ab-
sence of Congressional action in the area of asbestos, the fed-
eral courts remain circumscribed by state law."' 98
294. Id. at 893; see, e.g., Gallin v. Owens-Illinois 760 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (where, after Manville's share was subtracted from the judgment, defendant
was left with no judgment owing despite finding of liability).
295. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 871 (noting
that state provisions relating to joint and several liability vary markedly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction); see generally id. at 893 (noting that some states have other
set-off rules).
296. Id. at 894. Codefendants claimed that Manville's traditional share of liabil-
ity was 40%; the Trust estimated that claimants will most likely receive 15% for
Level One claims and 7.5% for Level Two claims. Id. The codefendants argued that
different allowances according to various state contribution laws would be "appropri-
ate." Id. at 895.
297. Id. at 872 (applying factors from Miree v. DeKalb County 433 U.S. 25
(1977); see Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966)("(1) the existence
of a substantial federal interest in the outcome of the litigation; (2) the effect on this
federal interest should state law be applied and (3) the effect on state interests
should state law be displace by federal common law.").
298. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 873 (citing
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)) (federal law
should apply only when the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign
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Noting the "strong federalism context of the issue [due to
the] great attention to tort reform [by the states] in recent
years,"29 9 the court turned to choice of law rules to see if they
offered a justification for the imposition of the uniform rule.300
New York's choice of law rules require the court to consider
each of the policies underlying the tort law of each state hav-
ing an interest in the action before deciding whether a single
rule of contribution could be applied to the consolidated
cases.301 Because of the requirement that the courts be "mind-
ful of Erie and comity considerations, the courts cannot disre-
gard the contents of recently enacted tort reform statutes in
many states." 302 The district court therefore concluded that
"the ultimate resolution of the applicable law in pending state
and federal asbestos cases must be determined by the court
hearing the case at the time the issue is presented. '"303
Next the court turned to whether the Settlement Plan it-
self could provide the basis for a uniform rule.304 However, the
court found that the uniform rule incorporated in the
modified Plan could not be imposed on the codefendants be-
cause they "did not draft it, they did not consent to it and
are intimately involved or because the interstate or international nature of the con-
troversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control). See also id. (citing Silkwood
v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)) ("[Tlraditional principles of state tort law
would apply with full force unless they were expressly supplanted.").
299. Id. at 878.
300. Id. at 878-94 (discussing the evolution of choice of law theories).
301. Id. at 883-85. The court noted that:
The Trust was created in New York. Its assets are in New York.. .. Many of
those injured are New York residents. Some of the key codefendant manufac-
turers either were incorporated in New York or have their principle place of
business in New York. New York has had a preeminent role in resolving the
conflicts problem.
Id. at 883. While this reinforced the use of New York choice of law rules by the court,
there were still an "expansive number of jurisdictions with an interest in the present
litigation" where class members lived, worked and were injured in other states. Id.
302. Id. at 884.
303. Id.
304. Id. See also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 843
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Weinstein, J.) (finding constitutional the application of a uniform
tort law because the chemical which caused plaintiffs' injuries was supplied under a
government contract and the plaintiffs were serving abroad at the time of injury and,
thus, state tort law was not implicated).
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they are emphatic in their insistence that it is anathema to
them. It would twist the facts beyond recognition to say that
the codefendants contracted to apply the tort rule embod-
ied. . .[in the] Settlement. '30 5
Nevertheless, the court held that the Settlement Plan
met the fairness requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).30" The
court found that the codefendants' rights were not extin-
guished because the Plan provides "uniform treatment for all
parties seeking contribution and indemnification from the
Trust." 307 Because the "Trust was created primarily as an en-
tity to compensate plaintiffs," 30 8 the court found that the allo-
cation of the burden of insuring full recovery to codefendants,
distributors and others was reasonable.30 9 The court urged
other courts to apply the recommended percentages of liabil-
ity calculated by the Trust to asbestos cases before them "to
the extent feasible and consistent with public policy." 10 Be-
cause the Settlement modification took place in the context of
a mandatory class action, the due process rights of the distrib-
utors and other co-defendants were a significant component of
the court's analysis of the fairness of any ruling that imposed
a uniform law and affected their rights to litigate.1 ' Ulti-
mately, the court had to find that, even though it could
strongly urge other courts to apply the uniform rule of the
Settlement, "the applicable law in pending state and federal
asbestos cases must be determined by the court hearing the
case at the time the issue is presented. '31 2
305. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 6, 129 B.R. at 886.
306. Id. at 902.
307. Id. The court noted that:
[T]o the extent that these objections raise questions concerning the protec-
tions distributors might be entitled to under recently enacted tort reform
statutes or court decisions, they are beyond the scope of the instant case.
Such unsettled areas of law ought to be resolved by the state courts or fed-
eral courts with appropriate venue which will be more familiar with the stat-
utory provisions and their legal history as well as facts of the particular case.
Id.
308. Id. at 898.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 895.
312. Id. at 884.
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In effect, the Settlement utilized a mandatory class action
to "cram down" the modification of the original Chapter 11
plan established by the Trust, not through the use of bank-
ruptcy rules, but in the context of a mandatory class action
that purported to bind all beneficiaries of the Trust. Co-de-
fendants and health claimant members of the Fed. R.
23(b)(1)(B) class appealed on the grounds that the trial court
had violated not only the Bankruptcy Code but the require-
ments of Fed. R. 23. In December 1992, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and set aside the Set-
tlement agreement.31
The Court of Appeals noted that the district court did
not relate its rulings specifically to the exercise of its diversity
jurisdiction or its jurisdiction as a bankruptcy court." 4 In its
analysis, however, the Second Circuit was careful to delineate
the due process protections under the requirements of Rule 23
and the procedural protections afforded to creditors under the
Bankruptcy Code.3 15
The court affirmed that, as a bankruptcy court, the court
below had authority to adjust the rights of creditors in rela-
tion to the Trust.3 16 However, any alteration of rights was lim-
ited by the constraints of state law and the Constitution. 7
The court noted that Rule 23 provided less elaborate protec-
tions to class members than bankruptcy procedures because,
under Rule 23, class representatives could bind class members
without their vote or consent.31 8 In bankruptcy, a plan of reor-
ganization could only be "crammed down" over the objection
of a dissenting class of creditors if strict fairness standards
were met. 319 The court was therefore "wary of any class action
settlement that accomplished more than a liquidation and pro
313. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 751 (2d Cir. 1992), vacat-
ing and remanding, 129 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
314. Id. at 735.
315. Id. at 740.
316. Id. at 745.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 736.
319. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126 (voting rights of creditors), 1129(b)(1) (fairness
standards) and 1129(a)(7) (plan may not be "crammed down" against consent of im-
paired class that would fare better under liquidation).
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rata reduction of the claims of a group of creditors and risked
circumvention of Bankruptcy Code protections. 3 20
Although the procedures of bankruptcy law provide the
normal vehicle governing the adjustment of creditors' rights
vis-a-vis each other to ensure fair distribution of the assets of
an insolvent corporation, the Second Circuit approved the use
of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class to serve as the representative
mechanism for creditors within the Manville bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.12 ' The court relied on its previous decision in In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.3 2 In that case, the
court had allowed the use of a mandatory non-opt-out
23(b)(1)(B) class to effect a readjustment of security holders'
rights to a payment fund established by a bankrupt brokerage
firm. 323 In Drexel, the creditors' rights were affected without
the protections of bankruptcy law, but the claimants' rights to
due process were protected by the division of the class into
subclasses representing the conflicting interests of the various
creditor groups. 24 Consistent with the Drexel holding, the cir-
cuit court held that the 23(b)(1)(B) class in the Manville ac-
tion would meet constitutional standards for due process if,
on remand, the district court provided for appropriate sub-
classes to reflect the differing interests within the overall class
of creditors. 25
The Court of Appeals specifically directed that subclasses
be formed to represent the interests of co-defendants 326 and
320. Id. at 737; see In re Shulman Transp. Enters., Inc., 21 B.R. 548, 551 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd 33 B.R. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 744 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1984)
(bankruptcy court must consider the fact that in most instances class action princi-
ples are antithetical to those in bankruptcy).
321. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 252, 982 F.2d at 721.
322. 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed sub nom. Hart Holding Co., Inc.
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1070 (1993).
323. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d at 290; but see New-
berg, supra note 29, § 20.26 at 631, § 20.30 at 641, § 20.31 at 647 (recommending class
action settlements if class members have the opportunity to vote for acceptance or
rejection of the reorganization plan).
324. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d at 292-93; Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 252, 982 F.2d at 738.
325. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., supra note 252, 982 F.2d at 739.
326. Id. While directing the trial court to clarify its interpretation of Section H,
the court withheld any ruling on its validity so that it would not influence with nego-
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health claimants by categories according to filing date of claim
and seriousness of illness.327 In the absence of such detailed
subgrouping, the court questioned whether a settlement could
be binding in a 23(b)(1)(B) no-opt-out class action. 8 Signifi-
cantly, the Second Circuit left open the question of whether
the trial courts could, on remand, establish a state law basis
for revising the beneficiaries' rights vis-a-vis each other. In the
absence of such a basis, the Settlement could not be effected
by a class action, even if subclasses were formed.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the
Bankruptcy Code empowered the district court to modify the
original Trust agreement. The court held that §1127(b) pro-
hibited the modification since the plan had been "confirmed
and substantially consummated."'329 Originally, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the health claimants had bargained for
their rights to payment before voting to confirm the original
Trust agreement, consequently those rights could not be mod-
ified post-confirmation. 3 0 However, on rehearing, the court
found the right of early filing claimants to receive priority of
payment was not intended to create enforceable legal
rights. 3 '1 Therefore, the Second Circuit reversed its ruling
mandating subclassing of health claimants by filing date.33 0 2
The court suggested that the way out of the legal morass
might well lie in a Chapter 11 proceeding for the Trust itself
or a second bankruptcy proceeding for Johns-Manville. 31 In
insisting on strict compliance with the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code and Rule 23, the court stated that the trial
court could not "invent remedies that overstep statutory limi-
tations .. "332
tiations between the parties on remand. Id. at 740.
327. Id. at 742.
328. Id. at 745.
329. Id. at 747.
330. Id. at 748.
330.1. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., - F.2d -, 1993 WL 141533,
*2 (N.Y.2d Cir. May 5, 1993).
330.2. Id. at 4.
331. Id. at 751.
332. Id.
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III. The Ramifications of Creative Judicial Management of
Asbestos Cases
A. Elements of the Asbestos Crisis: The Dragon
Individualistic judicial solutions to choice of law problems
and imposition of a uniform tort rule in consolidated asbestos
cases conflict with interests of federalism and comity man-
dated by the Constitution and recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. The tort systems of each state have evolved in highly
individualistic ways. The goals expressed in the tort law of the
various states have interlocking components. Contrary to the
feelings of many in the judiciary, the primary goal of these
systems is not "to compensate plaintiffs." Rather, state tort
laws reflect a balancing of the need to compensate plaintiffs
with the desire of states to protect their economic well-being
by insulating business within their borders from overwhelm-
ing liability.
Congressional silence in response to the call for federal
laws governing choice of law and tort is appropriate where the
states are situated to respond with particularity to the eco-
nomic problems inherent in the tension between the need to
compensate those injured and the need to protect industry.
However, the Constitution's protection of the states' interest
in balancing compensation and deterrence conflicts with the
need for global management of interstate mass tort cases, par-
ticularly those with multiple corporate defendants. As the as-
bestos cases demonstrate, the effects of defective and danger-
ous products is a phenomenon with national economic
consequences. Yet, without legislative intervention, there is no
procedural mechanism which can provide a single forum to
adjudicate the rights of all possible defendants and all possi-
ble plaintiffs, present and future. Even if it were possible to
bring all asbestos cases in the nation into a single forum, prin-
ciples of federalism prevent the application of a single rule of
law.
In the absence of congressional action to solve the
problems facing the courts in dealing with mass tort cases, the
role of the judiciary is changing. The costs and delays of case-
by-case adjudication frustrate the court's attempt to dispense
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justice. In response, the judiciary has become, by necessity,
more administrative and less "judicial" in the classical sense.
As the asbestos crisis in the courts has dragged on, judges on
the "firing line" in the trial courts have sought ways to handle
more cases at once. As previously noted, efficient procedural
management has become a judicial synonym for "the common
good." However, courts adjudicating mass tort claims tend to
dispense bureaucratic justice at the expense of party control
of the action and attention to the individual merits of each
claim.
Certainly, there is a great potential for abuse of choice of
law rules when a court faces the daunting task of reaching eq-
uitable and efficient resolution of asbestos cases under a class
action or other method of consolidation. Judges are necessa-
rily frustrated by the constraints inherent in choice of law
rules which reinforce the principles of federalism. If a judge
managing a mass tort case obeys the constitutional mandates
of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, the
case must fragment, to follow the dictates of individual state
law, into a myriad of mini-trials on the issues of causation,
liability, indemnity and contribution. This, as we have seen,
results in inconsistent judgments, delay, expense and crisis in
the courts. The growing tendency is for judges managing large
numbers of mass tort cases to impose their own conceptions of
good policy and to assume huge long-term administrative
burdens.
The rules of civil procedure delineate the boundaries of
due process. When the boundaries of procedural devices are
stretched, constitutional rights are compromised. When choice
of law rules are circumvented, principles of federalism are af-
fronted. However, many judges involved in adjudicating as-
bestos cases have advocated bending these rules as a means of
clearing dockets and dispensing "justice" on a mass scale. De-
spite the fact that appellate courts have frequently overturned
the rulings of creative judges, asbestos litigation has gradually
created its own body of law. As precedent, "asbestos law"
serves to dilute the importance of the delicate balancing of
economic interests inherent in state tort laws and the require-
ment that each case be heard on its own merits.
[Vol. 10
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/13
ASBESTOS DRAGON
B. The Adversarial Model and Theories for Resolution of
the Asbestos Crisis
Essentially, there are three possible responses to the di-
lemmas presented by asbestos litigation. First, do nothing. It
could be argued that judicial creativity at the trial court level
is balanced by the appellate courts which stand as a bastion
protecting against infringement on constitutional rights and
principles. However, in "the rush to conquer case loads,"
judges have assumed expanded managerial roles. They are ac-
tive in pre-trial management and settlement negotiations.
During these informal sessions, judges are exposed to "infor-
mation that would be considered inadmissible in courtroom
proceedings." Not only do the management techniques give
the individual judge more power over the case, but they neces-
sarily interfere with objectivity and the "blind justice, tradi-
tionally associated with the judicial role. Because of the lack
of structure in these situations, the resulting solutions are
necessarily very individualistic. Further, equitable resolution
of tort cases should not be the result of strong-arm tactics by
the trial court judge, but a product of law.
Second, Congress could pass legislation that would codify
the' judicial philosophy that broader jurisdictional power and
a single tort law would solve the problems inherent in adjudi-
cating the mass tort case. However, if the courts are to leap
into the breach and assume long-term administrative respon-
sibility for the settlements they engineer, this will affect the
needs of that system for additional staff to fulfill these obliga-
tions. The ramifications of this trend are far-reaching in terms
of increased costs and expansion of administrative responsi-
bilities extending far beyond the actual resolution of the dis-
pute which spawned the case. The question remains whether
mass tort cases with far-reaching economic consequences be-
long in the adversarial system of the judicial branch of
government.
The third response would be to remove multiple defend-
ant mass tort litigation from the judicial system. Congress
could provide for a "safety valve" arbitration panel designed
to deal with products liability when it grows to a certain pre-
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ordained proportion. A system could be designed where prod-
ucts liability cases were monitored on a national scale. When a
certain number of cases regarding a particular product or a
specific class of manufacturers had been filed nationwide,
Congress could mandate the removal of these cases to an arbi-
tration board created under the auspices of the legislative
branch. Therefore, the administrative burden in terms of both
costs and personnel would be shifted from the judiciary, free-
ing it to perform its function in the constitutional scheme.
Removal of asbestos litigation from the adversarial con-
text of the courts would serve the national interest in compen-
sation and deterrence in a way that the judiciary has been un-
able to do. Costs would be reduced because claims would be
arbitrated, not battled for in the courtroom. Overdeterrence
and business failure could be avoided by national assessment
of liability and provision for a reasonable method of compen-
sation. Finally, questions of liability of codefendants and their
rights of indemnity or contribution from the producer of the
product could be considered.
Only if all the injured and all of those who might be
found liable are present in one arena is it possible to actually
assess the total economic ramifications of a mass tort suit.
The task is primarily administrative and is not suited to the
adversarial methodologies of the judicial system. When the fi-
nal result in many recent mass tort cases has been judicially
mandated trust funds and ADR systems, why not remove the
burden from the judiciary and allow for the same mechanism
under the legislative branch? The questions raised by the his-
tory of asbestos litigation are: Do we want our judges to be-
come administrators? Do we want our court systems to be in-
volved in long-term commitments to managing and
supervising mass settlement agreements? And finally, what
are the constitutional ramifications of the choice of law deci-
sions being made by this creative judiciary faced with the cri-
sis in mass tort litigation?
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